Tax treaty and EU law aspects of the LOB and PPT provision proposed by BEPS action 6

status: accepte

International tax planning & prevention of abuse under domestic tax law, tax treaties & EC-law

PART ONE:THE USE OF CONDUIT & BASE COMPANIES IN INTERNATIONAL TAX PLANNING 1 1. CONDUIT COMPANIES 1 1.1. Treaty shopping 1 1.1.1. Description of the term “Treaty shopping” in relation to conduit companies 1 1.1.2. Basic features of “Treaty Shopping” in relation to conduit companies 6 1.1.2.1. Form of the conduit: company or partnership ? 6 1.1.2.2. Tax considerations in setting up the conduit 8 1.2. Directive shopping 11 1.2.1. Description of the term “Directive shopping in relation to conduit companies 11 1.2.2. Basic features of “Directive shopping” in relation to conduit companies 14 1.2.2.1. Conditions to be eligible for the benefits of the Directives 14 1.2.2.2. Tax considerations in setting up the conduit 17 1.3. Illustration 18 1.3.1. Conduit structures set up to claim tax benefits in the Source State 18 1.3.1.1. Directive shopping to organize an EU-Exit/Belgium: Source State 18 1.3.1.2. Treaty shopping/Belgium: Source State 19 1.3.1.3. Directive shopping to organize an EU-Exit/Belgium: Conduit State 20 1.3.1.4. Directive or Treaty Shopping : Same country holding-structure/Belgium: Conduit State 21 1.3.1.5. Treaty shopping/Belgium: Residence State 23 1.3.2. Conduit structures set up to claim tax benefits in the Residence State 24 1.3.2.1. Directive Shopping/Belgium: Conduit State 24 1.3.2.2. Directive Shopping to organize an EU-Entry/Belgium: residence State 25 1.3.3. Conduit structures set up to claim tax benefits in the Conduit State (“Treaty shopping”) 26 2. BASE COMPANIES 27 2.1. Characteristics of a “Base company” and of a “Base State” 27 2.1.1. Characteristics of a “Base company” 27 2.1.1.1. General 27 2.1.1.2. Base company: company or partnership? 28 2.1.2. Characteristics of a “Base State” 31 2.2. Use of base companies 33 2.3. Tax advantages aimed at by setting up a base company 35 2.3.1. Sheltering of income in a low tax regime 35 2.3.2. Tax deferral 36 2.3.3. Recharacterization of the income upon repatriation/Secondary sheltering 37 3. ILLUSTRATION 38 3.1. Belgium: Residence State of the controlling shareholders of the base company 40 3.2. Belgium: Source State of income flows to the base company 40 PART TWO: CONDUIT & BASE COMPANIES PREVENTION OF ABUSE UNDER BELGIAN DOMESTIC LAW THE (NON)-RECOGNITION OF A BELGIAN OR FOREIGN COMPANY OR OF ITS LEGAL ACTS FOR BELGIAN INCOME TAX PURPOSES 41 INTRODUCTION: SCOPE OF THE STUDY 41 1. THE RULE: RECOGNITION OF THE EXISTENCE OF A SEPARATE LEGAL ENTITY 41 1.1. Companies formed in accordance with the Belgian company laws 42 1.2. Companies formed under the rules of foreign company law 42 2. EXCEPTIONS TO THE RULE: NON-RECOGNITION OF A FOREIGN SEPARATE LEGAL ENTITY 51 2.1. Exceptions of international private law 51 2.1.1. Incompatibility with international public policy 51 2.1.2. The doctrine of “fraus legis” (“Abuse of law”; “Wetsontduiking”; “Fraude à la loi”) 54 2.2. Exceptions embodied in the Belgian Income Tax Code 57 2.3. Exceptions originating from the case law regarding sham 58 2.3.1. The current status of the Belgian case law regarding sham 58 2.3.1.1. The constitutional principle of taxation/The principle that private law governs tax law except if tax law provides otherwise 59 2.3.1.2. The civil law concept of sham (“veinzing”) 60 2.3.1.3. The concept of sham in Belgian income tax matters 62 2.3.1.3.1. The tax meaning of sham is not different from its civil law meaning/ Non-application of the doctrine of “fraus legis” (“abuse of law”) in Belgian income tax 62 2.3.1.3.2. “Legal substance” prevails over “economic substance” 68 2.3.1.3.3. The Supreme Court decision of 5 March 1999 70 2.3.2. The doctrine of sham and the (non)-recognition of a company or of its legal acts for Belgian income tax purposes 74 2.3.2.1. Application of the doctrine of sham to deny the legal personality (existence) of a company (“schijnvennootschap”) 75 2.3.2.1.1. Companies formed under Belgian law 75 2.3.2.1.2. Companies formed under foreign law 84 2.3.2.1.3. The Transworld Commodities Ltd-holdings: Court of Appeals Brussels, 9 June 1992 and Supreme Court, 3 June 1993 85 2.3.2.2. Application of the doctrine of sham to deny the residence of a company (“schijnzetel”) 88 2.3.2.2.1. The tests applied to determine the corporate residence for Belgian tax purposes 89 2.3.2.2.2. Principal place of management 92 2.3.2.3. Application of the doctrine of sham to deny the involvement of a company in a legal act (“schijnverrichting”) 99 2.3.2.3.1. The (Belgian or foreign) company is not the company that in reality has executed the legal act 99 2.3.2.3.2. The transaction in which the (Belgian or foreign) company was involved in a sham 121 3. APPLICATION OF ANTI-AVOIDANCE PROVISIONS 124 3.1. Specific anti-avoidance provisions aimed at international tax avoidance 125 3.1.1. Transfer pricing adjustments (Art. 26, Art. 207 and Art. 185 (2) BITC) 126 3.1.1.1. Article 26 BITC (profit adjustment for abnormal or gratuitous advantages) 127 3.1.1.2. Art. 185 (2) BITC (“Arm’s length”-principle) 136 3.1.2. Disallowance of expenses/Thin capitalization-rules 141 3.1.2.1. Disallowance of deduction of certain payments to residents of tax havens or to beneficiaries of foreign preferential tax regimes (Art. 54 BITC) 141 3.1.2.2. Thin capitalization-rules 150 3.1.2.2.1. Art. 198, 11° BITC (interest paid to lenders enjoying a preferential tax regime) 150 3.1.2.2.2. Art. 18, 4° BITC (interest paid to certain shareholders and directors) 155 3.1.3. The disregarding of asset transfers to low tax-jurisdictions (Art. 344 (2) BITC) 156 3.1.4. Anti-avoidance provisions relating to the participation exemption (Art. 202 and 203 BITC) 169 3.1.4.1. Conditions relating to the shareholding in the subsidiary 169 3.1.4.2. “Subject to tax”-requirement/Anti-avoidance provisions 171 3.1.4.2.1. Test one: The basic “subject to tax”-requirement 172 3.1.4.2.2. Test two: A company based in a country whose general tax regime is considerably more favorable than the Belgian tax regime 173 3.1.4.2.3. Test three: Financing, treasury and investment companies 175 3.1.4.2.4. Test four: Companies with offshore income 176 3.1.4.2.5. Test five: Companies with foreign branches 177 3.1.4.2.6. Test six: Conduit companies 177 3.1.5. Anti-avoidance provision relating to the interest withholding tax exemption (Art. 107 (2) 10° RDBITC) 178 3.2. The Belgian General Anti-Avoidance Rule (“the Belgian GAAR”) 179 3.2.1. Text and purpose of the Belgian General Anti-Avoidance Rule 179 3.2.2. Scope of application of the Belgian General Anti-Avoidance Rule 181 3.2.3. Interpretation of the Belgian General Anti-Avoidance Rule 183 3.2.3.1. General: Overview of possible interpretations 183 3.2.3.2. Textual interpretation 187 3.2.3.2.1. “Act or separate acts which together realize the same operation” 187 3.2.3.2.2. “The legal characterization given by the parties to an act or to separate acts (…)” 190 3.2.3.2.3. “The legal characterization (…) to an act (…) is not binding on the tax authorities (…)” 192 3.2.3.2.4. “When that administration determines, by means of presumption or other proof admitted by Art. 340, thas this characterization aims at avoiding taxes” 194 3.2.3.2.5. Recharacterization of the legal act(s) 197 3.2.3.2.6. Burden of proof of the taxpayer: “Legitimate needs of a financial or economic nature” 213 4. SUMMARY 219 4.1. (Non)-recognition of a Belgian or foreign company or of its legal acts for Belgian income tax purposes 220 4.2. Anti-avoidance rules in income tax matters 223 PART THREE: CONDUIT & BASE COMPANIES PREVENTION OF ABUSE UNDER BELGIAN TAX TREATIES 226 INTRODUCTION: SCOPE OF THE STUDY 226 1. THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN TREATIES AND DOMESTIC LAW IN BELGIUM 228 1.1. Belgium: a “monistic country” 228 1.2. International law prevails over domestic law: effect 228 2. THE INTERPRETATION OF BELGIAN TAX TREATIES 229 2.1. International law rules on treaty interpretation 229 2.1.1. The Vienna Convention on the law of treaties: application in Belgium 229 2.1.2. Article 31 VC: The general rule on treaty interpretation 230 2.1.2.1. Art. 31 VC: Three interpretation principles/one integrated interpretation method 230 2.1.2.2. The three principles laid down in Art. 31 VC 233 2.1.2.2.1. Interpretation in good faith 233 2.1.2.2.2. Textual interpretation in accordance with the “ordinary meaning” is not a synonym for literal interpretation 235 2.1.2.2.3. The requirement to take into consideration the treaty’s “object and purpose” does not justify a teleological interpretation 237 2.1.3. Article 32: Supplementary means of interpretation 242 2.1.4. Art. 31 and 32 VC: No numerus clausus 245 2.1.5. Conclusion 245 2.2. Application of domestic law to tax treaties 247 2.2.1. Art. 3 (2) OECD MC: A rule on treaty interpretation included in the OECD MC 247 2.2.1.1. Meaning of some of the expressions used in Art. 3 (2) OECD 249 2.2.1.1.1. “Any term not defined herein” 249 2.2.1.1.2. The meaning of the undefined treaty term under the law of the State applying the treaty 249 2.2.1.1.3. Static v. ambulatory interpretation? 252 2.2.1.1.4. Limits to ambulatory interpretation: “good faith” and “unless the context otherwise requires” 253 2.2.2. The relationship between Art. 3 (2) OECD MC and domestic anti-avoidance rules 261 2.3. Relevance of the OECD Commentary for the interpretation of tax treaties 265 2.3.1. Position of the OECD 266 2.3.2. Personal view 267 2.3.2.1. Current Commentary 267 2.3.2.2. Later Commentary 270 2.3.3. Case law 271 3. DO TAX TREATIES AND THE BELGIAN TAX TREATIES IN PARTICULAR INCLUDE AN IMPLIED ANTI-ABUSE RULE OF GENERAL APPLICATION OR AN INTERPRETA- TION PRINCIPLE ACCORDING TO WHICH TREATY BENEFITS SHOULD NOT BE CONFERRED IN ABUSIVE CASES? 272 3.1. Art. 26 VC: a legal basis for construing an implied anti-abuse rule? 273 3.1.1. Abuse of rights under international public law 273 3.1.2. Tax treaties 275 3.2. Anti-abuse rule in tax matters: a general principle of international law? 277 3.3. An interpretation principle within Art. 31 VC according to which treaty benefits should not be conferred in abusive cases? 282 3.3.1. The “Guiding Principle” formulated by the OECD 282 3.3.1.1. The first component of the OECD’s guiding principle: “a main purpose of the transaction is to secure a tax benefit under a tax treaty” 283 3.3.1.2. The second component of the OECD’s guiding principle: “obtaining that more favourable treatment in these circumstances would be contrary to the object and purpose of the relevant provision of the treaty” 287 3.3.1.2.1. The object and purpose of the OECD MC and tax treaties following the OECD MC 287 3.3.1.2.2. The prevention of tax evasion and tax avoidance: an object and purpose of tax treaties? 291 3.3.1.2.3. Observations and conclusion 293 3.3.2. The stated object and purpose of Belgian tax treaties 295 3.3.3. Object and purpose of the relevant treaty provisions 299 3.3.3.1. Determination of the policy motives of Contracting States: some issues 300 3.3.3.2. Each State sets its own policy 302 3.3.3.3. Reciprocity: a fundamental principle of tax treaties policy 303 3.3.3.4. Different State policies towards the same issue: the case of treaty shopping 303 3.3.3.5. Belgium’s policy towards treaty shopping 305 3.3.3.6. Prevention of double non-taxation is, absent specific provisions, not a treaty purpose 307 3.3.4. Analysis of international case law 311 3.3.4.1. Canada 311 3.3.4.2. Australia 316 3.3.4.3. The Netherlands & Switzerland 318 3.3.5. Conclusions 318 4. APPLICATION OF DOMESTIC ANTI-AVOIDANCE RULES TO TAX TREATIES: POSITION OF THE OECD AND ANALYSIS OF CASE LAW 319 4.1. Position of the OECD 319 4.1.1. OECD Commentary 1977 until 2003 319 4.1.2. OECD Commentary 2003 322 4.1.3. Conclusion 336 4.2. Analysis of international case law 337 4.2.1. Belgium 337 4.2.2. France 337 4.2.3. The Netherlands 339 4.2.4. Germany 344 4.2.5. United States 348 4.2.6. Canada 353 4.2.7. Switzerland 358 4.2.8. Austria 364 4.2.9. Finland 367 4.2.10. Conclusion 370 5. APPLICATION OF BELGIAN DOMESTIC ANTI-AVOIDANCE PROVISIONS TO TAX TREATIES: GENERAL OBSERVATIONS 371 5.1. Belgian tax treaties expressly allowing the application of domestic anti-avoidance provisions 371 5.2. Belgian tax treaties not expressly allowing the application of domestic anti-avoidance provisions: Negative implication ? 374 6. APPLICATION OF BELGIAN DOMESTIC ANTI-AVOIDANCE PROVISIONS TO TAX TREATIES: DISCUSSION OF THE PROVISIONS 379 6.1. The Belgian GAAR 379 6.1.1. Discussion of hypothetical cases 380 6.1.1.1. Premeditated sale and repurchase of minority shares 380 6.1.1.2. Earnings stripping and holding structures 383 6.1.1.3. Conduit company 387 6.1.1.4. Exemption of low or non-taxed foreign source income 389 6.1.2. Ambulatory and concordant interpretation/subsequent practice 391 6.2. “Thin capitalization”-rules 395 6.2.1. Compatibility of “thin capitalization”-rules with Art. 9 OECD MC 398 6.2.1.1. The relevance of Art. 9 OECD MC for the issue of “thin capitalization” 398 6.2.1.2. The consequences of Art. 9 (1) OECD MC being relevant 399 6.2.1.3. The relationship between Art. 9 (1) OECD MC and Art. 10 and 11 OECD MC 402 6.2.1.4. Testing the Belgian provisions against Art. 9 OECD MC 403 6.2.1.4.1. Art. 26 BITC 403 6.2.1.4.2. Art. 18, 4° BITC 407 6.2.1.4.3. Art. 54 BITC 409 6.2.1.4.4. Art. 198, 11° BITC 411 6.2.1.4.5. The Belgian GAAR 411 6.2.2. Compatibility of “thin capitalization”-rules with Art. 10 (3) and 11 (3) OECD MC 411 6.2.2.1. Analysis of Art. 10 (3) and 11 (3) OECD MC 412 6.2.2.2. Testing the Belgian “thin capitalization”-rules against Art. 10 (3) and 11 (3) OECD MC 414 6.2.2.2.1. Art. 18, 4° BITC 414 6.2.2.2.2. Art. 26, 54 & 198, 11° BITC 419 6.2.2.2.3. The Belgian GAAR 419 6.2.3. Compatibility of “thin capitalization”-rules with Art. 11 (6) OECD MC 420 6.2.3.1. Object and purpose of Art. 11 (6) OECD MC 420 6.2.3.2. Testing the Belgian “thin capitalization”-rules against Art. 11 (6) OECD MC 421 6.2.3.2.1. Art. 18, 4° BITC (excessive interest) 422 6.2.3.2.2. Art. 26 and 54 BITC 423 6.2.3.2.3. Art. 198, 11° BITC 424 6.2.4. Compatibility of “thin capitalization”-rules with Art. 24 (4) and (5) OECD MC 424 6.2.4.1. Discussion of Art. 24 (4) and (5) of the OECD MC 424 6.2.4.1.1. Art. 24 (4) OECD MC 424 6.2.4.1.2. Art. 24 (5) OECD MC 429 6.2.4.2. Discussion of the Belgian tax treaties 438 6.2.4.2.1. The inclusion of Art. 24 (4) and (5) in Belgian tax treaties 438 6.2.4.2.2. Testing of the Belgian “thin capitalization”-provisions against Art. 24 (4) and (5) of the Belgian tax treaties 439 6.3. CFC-legislation and Art. 344 (2) BITC 444 6.3.1. Arguments for consistency of CFC-legislation with tax treaties 445 6.3.1.1. The 1987 OECD Base Companies Report 445 6.3.1.2. The 1992 OECD Commentary 452 6.3.1.3. The 2003 OECD Commentary 453 6.3.2. Arguments for inconsistency of CFC-legislation with tax treaties 456 6.3.3. Court decisions on the questions of consistency of CFC-legislation with tax treaties 457 6.3.3.1. United Kingdom 457 6.3.3.2. France 460 6.3.3.3. Finland 463 6.3.3.4. Conclusion 464 6.3.4. Personal view 464 6.3.4.1. Entity method 465 6.3.4.1.1. Fiction of earned income (transparency-approach) 465 6.3.4.1.2. Fiction of a dividend distribution (Art. 10 OECD MC) 474 6.3.4.2. Transactional method 478 6.3.4.2.1. Attribution of tainted income (not as a deemed dividend) 479 6.3.4.2.2. Attribution of a deemed dividend 482 6.3.4.3. General conclusion 482 6.3.5. Art. 344 (2) BITC 485 6.3.5.1. General observation 485 6.3.5.2. Technical discussion 485 6.3.5.2.1. Conflict with Art. 9 OECD MC? 486 6.3.5.2.2. Conflict with Art. 7, 10-12 or 21 OECD MC? 487 6.4. Participation exemption 490 6.4.1. OECD MC 490 6.4.2. Belgian tax treaties 490 6.5. Art. 107 (2) 10° RD BITC 493 7. TREATY PROVISIONS PREVENTING ABUSE OF TREATIES 494 7.1. The “Beneficial ownership”-Limitation 495 7.1.1. Interpretation of the term “paid to” 495 7.1.1.1. OECD Commentary 496 7.1.1.2. Domestic law meaning under Art. 3 (2) OECD MC 499 7.1.2. Interpretation of the term “Beneficial owner” 500 7.1.2.1. History and background 500 7.1.2.2. Domestic law meaning of “beneficial owner”? 503 7.1.2.3. Treaty meaning of “beneficial owner”? 508 7.1.2.3.1. The treaty meaning = the common law meaning 509 7.1.2.3.2. The treaty meaning = the meaning emerging from the OECD Commentary 512 7.1.2.3.3. The treaty meaning = the person to whom the income is attributed for tax purposes 518 7.1.2.4. International case law 520 7.1.2.4.1. The Netherlands 521 7.1.2.4.2. France 522 7.1.2.4.3. Switzerland 524 7.1.2.4.4. United Kingdom 527 7.1.2.4.5. Conclusion 531 7.1.2.5. Personal view: how should a Belgian Court construe the term “beneficial owner”? 531 7.2. “Limitation on Benefit”-clauses 537 7.2.1. 2003 OECD Commentary 538 7.2.1.1. “Look-through”-approach 538 7.2.1.2. “Subject to tax”-approach 539 7.2.1.3. “Channeling”-approach 539 7.2.1.4. “Exclusion”-approach 540 7.2.1.5. Bona fide (safe harbour) provisions 541 7.2.1.6. Comprehensive “Limitation of Benefits”-clause 542 7.2.1.7. Anti-abuse provision dealing with source taxation of specific types of income (“main purpose”-test) 542 7.2.2. Belgian tax treaties 542 7.2.2.1. Belgium/Switzerland treaty 543 7.2.2.2. Belgium/US tax treaty 544 7.2.2.3. Belgium/Spain tax treaty 545 7.2.2.4. Belgium/Estonia; Latvia; Lithuania and Taiwan tax treaties 546 7.2.2.5. Belgium/Canada tax treaty 546 7.2.2.6. Belgian/Venezuela tax treaty 547 7.2.2.7. Relationship between the “Beneficial ownership”-requirement and the “Limitation of Benefits”-provisions 547 8. SUMMARY 548 8.1. Do tax treaties include an inherent anti-abuse rule of general application or an interpretation principle according to which treaty benefits are not to be conferred in cases of abuse? 548 8.2. The relationship between national anti-avoidance measures and tax treaties (general) 550 8.3. The relationship between national anti-avoidance measures and tax treaties (Belgium) 553 8.4. Application of treaty based anti-avoidance measures 557 PART FOUR: CONDUIT & BASE COMPANIES PREVENTION OF ABUSE UNDER COMMUNITY LAW 560 INTRODUCTION: SCOPE OF THE STUDY 560 1. ABUSE OF COMMUNITY LAW IN MATTERS NOT INVOLVING DIRECT TAXATION: ANALYSIS OF THE ECJ CASE LAW 563 1.1. Summary of the ECJ case law 563 1.2. Abuse of Community law: content of the concept 565 1.2.1. Discussion of the ECJ’s case law leading to Emsland Stärke 566 1.2.1.1. General discussion 566 1.2.1.2. The objective element 567 1.2.1.3. The subjective element 572 1.2.1.4. Conclusion 573 1.2.2. Beyond Emsland Stärke: the ECJ’s judgment in Halifax 574 1.2.3. Testing the objective circumstances of the case against the objectives of the Community law-provision allegedly abused 578 1.2.4. Conclusion 588 1.3. Prevention of abuse of Community law: Requirements set by ECJ case law to national anti-abuse provisions 590 2. ABUSE OF COMMUNITY LAW IN RELATION TO TAX AVOIDANCE: ANALYSIS OF THE ECJ’S CASE LAW 593 2.1. Introduction 593 2.2. Abuse of Community law in relation to tax avoidance and circumvention of national tax rules: scope of the concepts of “abuse of Community law” and of “tax avoidance” 593 2.2.1. Discussion of the ECJ’s case law 593 2.2.1.1. The case law up to Marks & Spencer (2005) and Cadbury Schweppes (2006) 594 2.2.1.2. The Cadbury Schweppes-case (2006) 597 2.2.1.3. The Marks & Spencer-case (2005) 604 2.2.1.4. Conclusions 607 2.3. Abuse of Community law: a general principle of Community law to prevent income tax avoidance? 609 3. THE METHODOLOGY OF THE ECJ IN HANDLING CASES OF ABUSE OF COMMUNITY LAW (IN PARTICULAR IN RELATION TO TAX AVOIDANCE) 612 3.1. The alleged abuser has access to the EC Treaty provisions on the freedoms 613 3.2. Examination of the substantive conditions for the application of the relevant Treaty freedom 615 3.2.1. The freedom of establishment (Art. 43-48 EC Treaty) 616 3.2.1.1. Personal scope of the freedom 616 3.2.1.2. Material scope of the freedom: meaning of the term “establishment” 618 3.2.1.2.1. “Actual pursuit of an economic activity” 618 3.2.1.2.2. “Fixed establishment” 622 3.2.1.2.3. “An indefinite period” 623 3.2.1.2.4. “In another Member State” 623 3.2.1.2.5. Conclusion 623 3.2.1.2.6. Passive investment companies, brass-plate and letter-box companies: further observations 624 3.2.2. Free capital movements (Art. 56-60 EC Treaty) 628 3.3. The domestic anti-avoidance measures is discriminatory or restricts the exercise of the Treaty freedom 630 3.3.1. Discrimination and restriction 630 3.3.2. Discriminatory and restrictive measures: different grounds of justification 634 3.4. Justification of the restriction to exercise the Treaty freedom because of abuse of Community law and/or the prevention of tax avoidance 635 3.4.1. General observations 635 3.4.2. Does the prevention of abuse (tax avoidance) fall within the express treaty exceptions? 637 3.4.3. Prevention of abuse (tax avoidance): an “overriding reason of

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